I. INTRODUCTION
In the time that it takes you to read this sentence, more than 11 million new emails will have been sent worldwide. 1 Email is just one of the many forms of electronic communication in the 21st century. The advent of the Internet transformed our society and enabled a world of hyperconnectivity and instant communication with each other, as well as seemingly limitless access to information. The often-ignored reality of technological advances in electronic communication is that with each new development comes the increased potential for an invasion of privacy. Before the telegraph, the only way to intercept communication between individuals meant overhearing a conversation or somehow obtaining a physical letter. 2 Then, it became possible to intercept the electrical signals sent by a telegraph to decipher the electronic communication. 3 Later, with the invention of the telephone came more advanced wiretapping, specifically the ability to listen to conversations without any physical presence at either end of the conversation. 4 Now with the popularity of email, text messaging, and other forms of internet communication, it is possible to intercept and easily create a comprehensive account of a person's conversations. By combining the content (e.g. the actual words spoken or written) of the communications themselves and the supporting non-content information-including, among other things, the time, length, and identities of sender and receiver-a much more accurate record of an individual's communications can be compiled than previously possible. 5 One remarkable aspect of these advances in electronic communications is how little control average consumers have over their emails, text messages, and phone conversations. Once an email or text message is sent, or a phone call made, the relevant service provider obtains certain data about that communication. In the short term, for example, sending a text message creates a record that contains the content of the message, the numbers of both parties, and the date and time of the message. 6 This data will then be stored somewhere on a server owned by the service provider, a decision that is entirely unregulated by any governing body. 7 Usually it is a purely business-minded decision. Microsoft, for example, initially stores customer emails and communications data from the popular Outlook.com email service at the closest datacenter to the location provided during the initial subscription of a particular customer. 8 Later, Microsoft transfers the data to a different datacenter according to the location the user provided when they initially 44 (1979) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not apply to pen registers because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily given to a third party).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that email headers and IP addresses are akin to pen registers and have no Fourth Amendment protection). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that an ISP cannot be compelled to turn over the contents of a subscriber's emails because doing so would violate the subscriber's reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
6. See Joseph B. Evans, Cell Phone Forensics: Powerful Tools Wielded by Federal Investigators, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.: JCFL BLOG (June 2, 2016), https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2016/06/02/cell-phone-forensics-powerful-tools-wielded-byfederal-investigators/. Notably, there is no current law in place that requires wireless carriers to store the content of text messages, so none of the major carriers store this portion of the record long-term. See id. (explaining that most carriers will delete the contents of text messages "after delivering them" but will retain the transactional data for "sixty days to seven years").
7. While there are statutes regulating electronic communications, discussed infra, these laws do not seek to control the physical location of servers because the internet spans across borders. Nonetheless, our data privacy laws resemble a "patch-work quilt," in that regulations are implemented on an industry-by-industry basis and different forms of data are subject to vastly different regulations. signed up for Outlook, but ultimately Microsoft has full discretion to control where the data is located at any given time. 9 Sometimes this results in U.S.-based customers' emails and other relevant data being stored in a separate state, but still within the jurisdiction of the U.S. government. But more often the service providers move the data to servers located in foreign countries, where they have installed datacenters to take advantage of favorable tax benefits and other cost savings. These business decisions have the unfortunate effect of potentially bringing the data out of the reach of lawful criminal investigations seeking warrants in U.S. courts. One example is the recent Microsoft v. United States case, in which the Second Circuit overturned a lower court's order that Microsoft produce a customer's email data stored in Dublin, Ireland.
10
In another example, Google has attempted to build off-shore data barges that would be outside the jurisdiction of any sovereign nation.
11
The law's responses to the advance in electronic communications is notable. Only within the last fifty years has Congress brought electronic transmissions within the confines of Fourth Amendment protection, namely through the enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Communications Act.
12
Because the Fourth Amendment's text only covers individuals' "persons, houses, papers, and effects," 13 the legislature and judiciary initially resisted extending protections beyond this literal language (i.e. when a new technology is developed), but eventually viewed the protections as necessary with the passing of time and increasing societal adoption of new technologies.
14 Recently, the Supreme Court has grappled with the Fourth Amendment's application to the cellphone, and its more clever cousin the 9. See id. at 203 ("One of Microsoft's datacenters is located in Dublin, Ireland, where it is operated by a wholly owned Microsoft subsidiary. According to Microsoft, when its system automatically determines, 'based on [the user's] country code,' that storage for an e-mail account 'should be migrated to the Dublin datacenter,' it transfers the data associated with the account to that location. Before making the transfer, it does not verify user identity or location; it simply takes the user-provided information at face value, and its systems migrate the data according to company protocol." (citations omitted)).
10. While this interpretation is both legally and textually sound, the Second Circuit's decision is quite troublesome because the district court's reasoning was equally sound. The problem lies with the ambiguity found in Section 2703 of the SCA. Taking this a step further, the SCA as a whole has largely become obsolete over time and if no changes are made the statute will be become inconsistent with evolving Fourth Amendment protections and privacy law doctrines as applied to current and future technologies. This Note argues that warrants issued under the Stored Communications Act ("SCA warrants") should be treated not as traditional search warrants but rather as subpoenas, or possibly a "hybrid" somewhere between the two, at least until Congress updates the SCA to reflect modern technological advances.
Part In Katz, the government introduced evidence of a telephone conversation that the FBI had obtained via an electronic recording device placed on a public, glass telephone booth.
36
The Court's prior decisions focusing on physical trespass failed to recognize and properly account for advances in technology, a factor implicit in its holding that such surveillance (wiretapping a public telephone booth) was not permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
37
The Court rejected the government's visibility argument, distinguishing between "the intruding eye" and "the uninvited ear." 38 Further, the Court concluded, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment, that "[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures." (stating that the third-party doctrine is "the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate. It is the Lochner of search and seizure law," but providing a defense of the doctrine) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 563 n.5 (citing major criticisms some exceptions to the third-party doctrine, developed both within the judiciary 43 and through federal legislation. 44 The judicial exceptions to the third-party doctrine consist of areas outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment and that are already addressed in other bodies of law that deter governmental abuse of the use of secret agents. 45 Legislation has typically been enacted in response to specific cases. 
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Stored Communications Act
The relevant exception in this Note is the ECPA. In 1986, Congress' main goal in enacting the ECPA was to update the nearly twenty-year-old Federal Wiretap Act to cover newer communication technologies, namely computer-based communications and other forms of digital communication.
52
The ECPA consists of three parts Title II is known as the Stored Communications Act ("SCA") which protects content and subscriber records held by a service provider about or from a subscriber, 55 and Title III addresses "pen registers and trap and trace devices." 56 1. Overview of the Stored Communications Act
The SCA "was enacted to extend to electronic records privacy protections analogous to those provided by the Fourth Amendment." 57 Specifically, the SCA protected electronic communication services and remote computing services, distinctions that accurately reflected the common understandings of how computer networks functioned at that time (i.e. in 1986). 58 Generally, service providers are prohibited from disclosing the records provided to them by their subscribers, although the SCA creates several exceptions to the general obligations of nondisclosure. 59 While not directly relevant to the arguments presented in this Note, it is helpful to understand the overall structure of the SCA as enacted. The beginning section of the SCA imposes criminal punishments for unauthorized use of a service provider's facilities used for storage of electronic communication services. 60 Unauthorized use can either be when one "accesses without authorization," or when one "exceeds an authorization to access . Although not explicitly defined in the statute, unauthorized use of electronic storage devices or computer equipment can be accomplished by physically entering the facility without authorization or by "hacking" the computer systems to access the facility. See Orin S. Kerr, Vol. 66
As noted, the second section of the SCA imposes a duty of nondisclosure of electronic communications and customer records upon service providers with certain limited exceptions. 62 The SCA distinguishes between "contents of a communication" and "customer records." 63 Section 2703 then establishes conditions under which a service provider is required to disclose the contents of stored communications or non-content related customer information. 64 The provisions of Section 2703 address governmental access to service provider records in a "pyramidal structure." 65 First, the government can obtain from a service provider the most basic non-content information, which includes: name, address, telephone connection records (session times and durations), length of service, types of service utilized, telephone numbers and other subscriber numbers or identities, and means or source of payment.
66
This can be done with relative ease: the government can obtain a warrant, court order, administrative subpoena, or consent of the customer, but is not required to do so as long as it is seeking only the non-content information. in Section 2703(a), which states that for content records made and stored within the past 180 days the government is required to obtain an SCA warrant.
72
For content records in storage for more than 180 days the provisions of Section 2703(b) apply, and an SCA warrant must only be obtained if the government is not willing to provide notice to the customer.
73
As with any federal law, courts interpret the provisions of the SCA based on congressional intent, starting with the explicit statutory language.
74
Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the analysis ends and the statute is interpreted based on the plain meaning of the terms used.
75
But where the language is ambiguous, courts turn to the "statutory structure, relevant legislative history, [and] congressional purposes." 76 The structure of the SCA echoes traditional Fourth Amendment privacy protections for physical objects, especially the home, by creating similar protections for digital and electronic communications that have been disclosed to a third-party service provider. 77 Previously, the Constitution placed no disclosure limits on service providers-because of the thirdparty doctrine-and so the government could obtain any records with a subpoena and no requirement of notice or consent to the customer.
78
In enacting the SCA, Congress brought digital and electronic communications out of the scope of the third-party doctrine by defining methods for governmental access.
79
The legislative history of the SCA can help courts determine congressional intent regarding specific issues, for example the extraterritorial reach of the SCA as discussed later.
80
The congressional purpose is rather clear-the SCA is a privacy-focused law geared towards electronic communications taking place on computer networks and thereby disclosed to third-party service providers. The main purpose in enacting the SCA, as part of the ECPA, was to update previous federal legislation and ensure that new forms of communication would be afforded the same Fourth Amendment privacy protections as more traditional communication methods despite the thirdparty doctrine.
84
As technology has advanced, courts have applied the ECPA and SCA without issue because the underlying electronic communications methods have remained relatively similar over time. Text messaging, instant messaging, and social media chat programs function much like email, in that the communications and customer information is stored not only by the consumer on their own device, but also in a facility owned by a service provider. As a result, the SCA has been applied to these new forms of communication 85 relatively easily, and so the SCA has not meaningfully changed since 1986. ( proposing an amendment to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 prohibiting providers of "remote computing service or electronic communication service to the public from knowingly divulging to a governmental entity the contents of any communication that is in electronic storage or otherwise maintained by the provider, subject to exceptions.").
C. The Microsoft Case
Microsoft v. United States commenced when the government sought to obtain records of an email account potentially used in furtherance of narcotics trafficking. 87 Magistrate Judge James Francis of the Southern District of New York issued an SCA warrant to Microsoft to disclose "information associated with a specified web-based e-mail account that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Microsoft Corporation." 88 The warrant directed Microsoft to provide: a. The contents of all e-mails stored in the account, including copies of e-mails sent from the account; b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and sources of payment (including any credit or bank account number); c. All records or other information stored by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, pictures, and files; d. All records pertaining to communications between MSN . . . and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken. 89 Microsoft complied with the warrant in part by providing the relevant noncontent information, but it omitted the content information after determining that the content information for the target account had been transferred to its Dublin datacenter. and that the SCA does not mention an extraterritorial application.
92
On the issue of extraterritoriality, Judge Francis determined that the words "using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" found in Section 2703(a) were ambiguous. 93 Judge Francis ultimately denied the motion, indicating that while Microsoft's argument was "not inconsistent with the statutory language, [it was] undermined by the structure 94 of the SCA, by its legislative history, and by the practical consequences that would flow from adopting it." 95 The main rationale for rejecting Microsoft's extraterritoriality argument was that this particular type of warrant was not like a traditional search warrant but more of a "hybrid" between a traditional search warrant and a subpoena. 96 When issued a subpoena, the recipient is required to produce any information requested within its control. 97 The court felt that since Microsoft owned the server located in Dublin, it was within its control and Microsoft was required to produce any documents or information with no regard to actual physical location of the server on which that information was stored.
98
Judge Francis also suggested that any concerns with the extraterritoriality of the SCA "are simply not present here" because:
[the] SCA Warrant does not criminalize conduct taking place in a foreign country; it does not involve the deployment of American law enforcement personnel abroad; it does not require even the physical presence of service provider employees at the location where data are 98. The court based this determination on the established principle that a subpoena carries an obligation to produce information regardless of its location. See id.
stored. At least in this instance, it places obligations only on [Microsoft] to act within the United States. 99 Microsoft then appealed the decision. 100 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court, instructing the court to quash the warrant. 101 The Second Circuit rejected the approach adopted by Judge Francis to categorize an SCA warrant as a "hybrid" between a traditional search warrant and a subpoena, and instead interpreted the SCA to use "warrant" as a term of art. 102 In considering whether the SCA would apply extraterritorially, the court began its analysis by reviewing the presumption against extraterritoriality outlined in the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd. 103 In Morrison, the Court held that laws enacted by Congress are presumed to only apply domestically unless there is a "clear indication of an extraterritorial application." 104 Because the SCA does not include an explicit extraterritorial application, the government conceded this point in Microsoft, and the Second Circuit determined that the warrant provisions did not contemplate or permit extraterritorial application on their face. 105 The court next analyzed whether the challenged application unlawfully applied the particular statute. 106 In doing so, the court determined the "focus" of the SCA was primarily privacy-based due to the statute's plain meaning, 107 its overall framework, 108 and its legislative history. 109 The court also disagreed with the district court's suggestion that the actual physical location of the server did not invoke extraterritoriality concerns, specifically because in order to actually retrieve the information, Microsoft would have to interact with the Dublin datacenter in some way, whether through its domestic systems using the internet or by physically going to Ireland.
110
The Second Circuit concluded that with the SCA's privacy focus, the execution of the SCA warrant in question would be an unlawful extraterritorial application of the SCA.
111
Between the district court's decision and the appeal to the Second Circuit, courts in three different cases cited the district court opinion approvingly, granting an SCA warrant for data located on foreign servers. The Second Circuit ultimately denied the government's request for rehearing on January 24, 2017, after failing to receive a majority of votes favoring en banc review. 115 Nonetheless, five members of the court wrote opinions expressing many of the concerns resulting from the prior decisions by the district court and the Second Circuit.
116
In an opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Circuit Judge Susan L. Carney agreed with the panel's reasoning in its majority opinion, but repeatedly referenced the inadequacy of the SCA in the current state of technology.
117
The remaining four opinions were authored by the With three circuit judges recused from the voting, id. at 54 n.*, the panel was split at 4-4, and the rehearing was denied.
116. Id. at 54. 117. See id. at 55 (Carney, J., concurring) ("We recognize at the same time that in many ways the SCA has been left behind by technology."); id. at 59 (Carney, J., concurring) ("Fragmentation, an issue raised by the government in its petition and by the dissents here, was not present in the facts before the panel, and only further emphasizes the need for a modernized statute."); id. at 60 (Carney, dissenters. All of the authoring judges and the parties agreed that the SCA lacks a clear textual basis for extraterritoriality, 118 but each dissenter reiterated as a critical issue of their argument the district court's determination of the irrelevancy of the precise location of the server on which the data was located.
119
In the wake of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' denial, the controversy is nowhere near settled. A bonafide circuit split has yet to fully manifest, but courts continue to favorably cite to the Second Circuit decision in Microsoft, as well as the district court decision it overruled. 120 Ultimately, this dispute is now on track for final resolution by the Supreme Court.
121
There appears to be significant external support for both sides.
122
The Court must now reach a resolution that creates the best "balance J., concurring) ("And we can expect that a statute designed afresh to address today's data realities would take an approach different from the SCA's, and would be cognizant of the mobility of data and the varying privacy regimes of concerned sovereigns, as well as the potentially conflicting obligations placed on global service providers like Microsoft.").
118. E.g., id. at 55 (Carney, J., concurring) ("[I]t is common ground that Congress did not intend for the SCA's warrant procedures to apply extraterritorially."); id. at 60 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("As all seem to agree, and as the government concedes, the Act lacks extraterritorial reach.").
119. See id. at 61 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("[N]o extraterritorial reach is needed to require delivery in the United States of the information sought, which is easily accessible in the United States at a computer terminal."); id. at 63 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) ("The panel majority ignored the fact that Microsoft lawfully had possession of the emails; that Microsoft had access to the emails in the United States; and that Microsoft's disclosure of the emails to the government would take place in the United States."); id. at 70 (Raggi, J., dissenting) ("It is simply unprecedented to conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality bars United States courts with personal jurisdiction over a United States person from ordering that person to produce property in his possession (wherever located) when the government has made a probable cause showing that the property is evidence of a crime."); id. at 76 (Droney, J., dissenting) ("Microsoft has possession and immediate access to those emails regardless of where it chose to store them.").
120. As of September 2017, the District Court decision has been cited eight times, the Second Circuit decision has been cited twenty-three times, and the rehearing denial has been cited fourteen times. 
A. SCA & The Microsoft Case
The SCA inadequately protects the most common forms of electronic communications in modern society. While at one time the SCA applied the Fourth Amendment to electronic communications appropriately, advances in technology mean that the statute is being applied in situations and to forms of electronic communication that the legislature in 1986 could not have predicted. The SCA is narrowly written with an eye towards providing Fourth Amendment-like protections for electronic communications taking place on pre-internet computer networks. With the internet, traditional understandings of international borders are becoming obsolete. On its face, the SCA is unclear as to how far geographically the statute reaches. Because the plain language of Section 2703(a) is unclear regarding extraterritoriality, courts must consider congressional intent based on its overall structure established thirty years ago, a scant legislative history that equally supports two opposing views, and a privacy-focus that has changed substantially over time. While in 1986 the SCA was sufficient to fulfill its intended purpose-granting electronic communications equivalent protection under the Fourth Amendment-it no longer serves that purpose and should be updated to reflect technological changes in the past thirty years and in such a way that contemplates future advances.
SCA Warrant as Hybrid Search Warrant?
The district court's decision to categorize an SCA warrant as a "hybrid" between a traditional search warrant and a subpoena aligns with the statutory provisions. The structure of the SCA allows the government the option to obtain an SCA warrant for any information but only requires a warrant supported by probable cause for the contents of emails made within the previous 180 days. 124 In other words, in situations where the government is not required to obtain a warrant, it will not be motivated to do so and will instead probably seek a subpoena, which compels a service provider to provide the records even if they are overseas. 125 Even where an SCA warrant is obtained, there is no functional difference between the SCA warrant and a subpoena for service providers like Microsoft, who will ultimately disclose the information.
More than likely, after being issued a subpoena Microsoft will direct an employee or representative to obtain the non-content records requested therein by accessing the data stored in the Dublin datacenter through the internet from a location in the United States. Alternative methods, like having a Dublin-based employee personally deliver the records to the United States or paying for a U.S.-based employee to retrieve the records from Dublin, would be implausible, cost-inefficient, and needlessly timely. Had Microsoft chosen to comply fully with the SCA warrant, their process for obtaining the relevant data would be the same: a Microsoft employee or representative would have accessed the data through the internet from a physical location within the United States. Even though the SCA does use the term of art "warrant," whether the legislature intended for an SCA warrant to fully mirror traditional search warrants issued under the Fourth Amendment is unclear, as demonstrated by the conflicting opinions issued by the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as many other courts since.
126
If SCA warrants are treated as hybrid search warrants in the way the district court would have allowed, there will be both legal and practical advantages and disadvantages. The main benefit of this approach is that access to electronic communications records will not be placed completely out of the reach of lawful government investigations by being stored abroad. In order to obtain an SCA warrant, the government must still show probable cause in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 127 but the service provider will not be able to conceal these records by moving them to a server in a foreign country to save money or, in the case of a customer request, by incorrectly telling the service provider he or she is in Dublin. Treating an SCA warrant as a traditional warrant also has advantages and disadvantages. The government's power would be limited to obtaining only those records that are within its jurisdictional control or covered by an MLAT. Concerns with extraterritoriality, or circumventing international laws, are rendered moot. As indicated previously, however, the SCA only requires the government to obtain a warrant for contents of electronic communications made within the previous 180 days. If service providers comply with an SCA warrant in the same way as a subpoena issued for the same or similar records (offset by the temporal limits of the SCA), the practical difference between these two is nearly nonexistent. Just as Microsoft has done, service providers will refuse to produce records requested by SCA warrant. The largest negative effect is that with no access to content records from the previous 180 days stored in a specific location by a service provider, government investigations will be severely hindered because of a business decision by a service provider to save money by locating its servers overseas. Ultimately, the SCA's "warrant" can plausibly be interpreted as a traditional search warrant or a subpoena. Advances in technology and the prevalence of email and other forms of digital communication necessitate an increasing reliance on third-party service providers who are storing that data. This change has revealed an ambiguity in the SCA that was easily overlooked by Congress in 1986, with the SCA no longer sufficiently serving its original purpose.
The "Correct" Outcome
Either of the interpretations given throughout the proceedings of Microsoft are "correct." Both the district court and the Second Circuit applied the proper statutory interpretation rules, but in the end, they produced entirely different results. Nonetheless, the hybrid approach taken by the district court is a better outcome because the SCA warrants are limited in subject matter in that they are only being issued on service providers to provide records of email and other electronic communications. Congress' attempt to remove these records from the confines of the third-party doctrine has resulted in an incompatible result. An SCA warrant directs service providers to produce the same exact sorts of records as a subpoena, the only difference being how recently the communications may have been sent.
Once one takes into account the technical differences between electronic communications as they occurred in 1986-via individual computer networking and before the internet-versus the methods used for email, text messaging, instant messaging, and other forms of modern electronic communications, the urgency to fix the SCA is apparent. Back in 1986, any records that would have been subject to the SCA were likely communications between parties in the United States that travelled directly between them and were only stored in two domestic locationsthe computer of the sender and the computer of the receiver. Whereas now, an email or text message between the same two parties could travel between numerous locations worldwide, all in the blink of an eye, and ultimately end up "stored" on a data server in Ireland. Also, as noted by one of the dissenters in the denial of the rehearing en banc, some service providers are already undermining the effectiveness of an SCA warrant in light of the Second Circuit's decision by refusing to disclose information stored abroad. 133 Seeing courts adopt the hybrid approach also invokes a more immediate basis for change by the legislature than continuing to treat an SCA warrant as a traditional search warrant would. Consider the path that most new communications technologies have undergone before eventually being given Fourth Amendment-like protections. 134 Usually when a new technology is created, it is adopted by the public, and eventually the government will find a way to track or reach those communications. Then, those technologies will either be granted Fourth Amendment protections in the form of a judicial decision or by the legislature in the form of a statute. 135 Email, while technically covered under the SCA, is a fairly new form of electronic communication, or at least different enough from the electronic communications that existed in 1986 when the SCA was enacted, to justify new protections. Microsoft is an opportunity for the courts and legislature to ensure that new forms of electronic communication are guaranteed the protections they deserve under the Fourth Amendment. Whether that comes in the form of a Supreme Court decision, an amendment to the SCA, or an entirely new statute by the legislature, a change is needed.
B. Effects & Policy Considerations
Either interpretation-SCA warrant as hybrid search warrant or SCA warrant as a traditional search warrant-raises legitimate policy concerns. Treating an SCA warrant as a traditional search warrant limits the reach of a legitimate government investigation in obtaining electronic communications of suspects or criminal defendants. But since the government in no way regulates the service providers as to data storage and the internet allows transfer of data across the world in an instant, Microsoft and others are free to store these records on any server within their control. The applicability of the SCA should not hinge on a purely business-based decision because this allows private entities to dictate how the law will apply in certain situations. 136 Consequently, since the data storage policies of service providers like Microsoft are not regulated, they have no incentive to take any extra steps to adhere to federal laws like the SCA in regards to where they store their data for the benefit of the government. Since the records are stored based on customer-provided location information, any individual with nefarious means can successfully conceal electronic communications from governmental access by lying about their actual locations when they sign up for a new service. Even law-abiding individuals who are concerned about their privacy may want to protect their electronic communications from prying government eyes if they know they can avoid it by merely telling their ISP they are from a different country.
C. Updating the SCA
Updating the SCA, 137 and other similarly outdated statutes, to address the issues in Microsoft Corp. and to more accurately reflect advances in technology would help courts more accurately address the above issues regarding electronic communications and other data. For instance, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 enabled the government to track and intercept nearly all forms of communication by creating new crimes and procedures and making sweeping amendments to many different sections of the Code, all as a powerful response by Congress to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. 138 136. The obvious criminal investigations at stake involve email-based crimes, like fraud in the form of email or phishing scams. However, as the internet continues to be a part of our lives, more and more forms of crime will likely start to cross over into the digital world, e.g. cyber-bullying, internet-initiated sex crimes, et al.
137. See Kerr, Next Generation, supra note 57, at 411-18 (discussing suggestions for updating the entire ECPA).
138. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept another country for purely economic reasons.
IV. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Fourth Amendment recognized the importance of privacy and sought to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of their property by the government. At first, protections were limited to the home, but eventually were interpreted to include public areas where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Then, the reasonable expectation of privacy afforded in certain contexts was interpreted to exclude information and records voluntarily disclosed to third parties. As technology continued to advance, Congress felt it necessary to protect certain forms of information by granting Fourth Amendment-like protections through statutory frameworks for new types of physical and electronic records.
In the SCA, Congress sought to protect electronic communications disclosed and stored by third-party service providers. The SCA has operated for the past thirty years with relative consistency and has been interpreted to include newer forms of digital communication, like text messaging and social media programs. However, as seen in Microsoft, the time has come to update the SCA to clear up the ambiguities that have arisen because of advances in technology. In Microsoft, the Second Circuit held that the SCA did not contemplate an extraterritorial application and thus Microsoft did not have to produce emails stored on a server in a foreign country. This decision is the incorrect outcome because an SCA warrant is more like a subpoena, or at least a hybrid between a subpoena and a traditional search warrant.
Going forward, the SCA must be updated to reflect technology changes over the past thirty years and to reflect changes that may appear in the future. Meanwhile, courts should interpret the SCA in a way that treats SCA warrants more like subpoenas, as the district court in Microsoft indicated. Doing so is more in line with the structure of the SCA than an alternative approach. Further, this interpretation alleviates any potential circumvention of legitimate criminal investigations where the government would otherwise be shut off from obtaining electronic communications records due to either a business decision made by a service provider or a conscious decision by a customer to conceal their records by providing misleading information to the service provider. As technology continues to improve, courts and the legislature must be constantly vigilant of the existing laws and their continuing applicability. Should the opportunity for individuals to take advantage of gaps in statutory provisions arise, the law should be quick to address these shortcomings.
